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ABSTRACT
Genealogies are an increasingly important part of contemporary political
philosophy. However, even recent genealogies differ a great deal in terms of
their ends and methods. Strikingly, this has received virtually no discussion in
the literature. This article begins to fill that gap. It does so by comparing and
contrasting the genealogies of Bernard Williams, Quentin Skinner, and
Raymond Geuss, exploring their different goals, methods, and value for political
philosophy. This helps us better understand these different kinds of genealogy
in their own right; shows the distinct value of each of these different kinds of
genealogy to political philosophy; and enables political philosophers to better
be able to select the kind of genealogical investigation most relevant to their
interests and to employ the correct kind of genealogy better as a result.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 1 October 2019; Accepted 3 February 2020
KEYWORDS Genealogy; political philosophy; ideology critique; Bernard Williams; Raymond Geuss;
Quentin Skinner
1. Introduction
Genealogies are an increasingly important part of contemporary political
philosophy (Alexander 2019; Koopman 2019, 2013; Srinivasan 2019;
Clifford 2013; Bevir 2008; Halpern 2002; Geuss 2003; Williams 2002;
Skinner 2002; Jesse Prinz 2016; Biebricher 2016). The different kinds of
investigation that ‘genealogy’ is used to refer to, and what their goals
are, vary considerably. Although both Nietzschean (Nietzsche 2017;
Schacht 1994; Owen 2007; Leiter 2002; Leiter and Sinhababu 2007; May
1999, 2011) and Foucauldian (Foucault 1995, 1978; Lemke 2019; Visker
1995; Clifford 2001; Saar 2007) genealogies are by now reasonably
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well-understood, the same cannot be said for more recent variants. Strik-
ingly, this fact has received virtually no explicit discussion in the literature.
This article begins to fill that gap. Rather than asking ‘what genealogy is’, on
the assumption that there is a single set of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions that they all share, we look at three different kinds of genealogy
used by contemporary political thinkers and investigate what value these
genealogies hold for political philosophy: Raymond Geuss’ genealogy of
privacy (Geuss 2003), Bernard Williams’ genealogy of the virtues of truth
and truthfulness (Williams 2002), and Quentin Skinner’s genealogy of the
concept of the state (Skinner 2008). As already suggested, we focus on
these three because they are nowhere near as well-understood as their
Nietzschean and Foucauldian counterparts; because despite their close con-
nections in space, time, and institution they are in fact strikingly different;
and because focusing on these three will therefore be the most useful for
enhancing the genealogical toolbox available to political philosophers.1
Analysing these three contemporary forms of genealogy will thus make
the following contributions to the literature. Firstly, we show that Geuss,
Williams, and Skinner – despite their social, geographical, and historical
proximity – develop genealogies that employ rather different methods
or approaches to achieve different ends. Secondly, exploring the differ-
ences and similarities between these genealogies will help us to better
understand the genealogies they offer, along with the differing methods
they employ. Thirdly, our analysis will provide us with a better understand-
ing of the distinct value or usefulness that each of them have for political
philosophy. This will in turn, fourthly, enable political philosophers inter-
ested in using the tools of genealogy to better select and make use of
the kind(s) of genealogy most appropriate to their needs and interests.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 argues that what we call
Raymond Geuss’ ‘genealogy as critique’ offers an accurate historical
account which is designed to challenge our unreflective notion of a
single, unitary, and historically constant public/private distinction –
though without offering a representative map of different conceptions of
it. This is supposed to cause readers to re-think how they conceptualise
the distinction and to act better politically as a result. We go on to argue
1Part of the reason for this is, in turn, that especially Geuss and Williams have written explicitly about the
methodology of contemporary political philosophy, making their work on genealogy perhaps more
interesting thereto. Another thing that connects these thinkers is their broad adherence, especially in
Geuss’ and Williams’ case, to realism in political philosophy (on which see Janosch Prinz 2016; Raekstad
2018; Rossi 2019; Rossi and Sleat 2014). Geuss’ and Williams’ genealogies in particular has formed the
basis for recent radical realist genealogies), though this is not something we can pursue in this paper
(but see Prinz and Rossi 2017 and Rossi and Argenton Forthcoming).
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that this kind of genealogy is particularly useful both for non-moralizing pol-
itical criticism and for forming a valuable part of certain ideology critiques.
Section 3 examines Bernard Williams’ imaginary genealogy, as carried out in
Truth and Truthfulness. Among other things, this kind of genealogy is primar-
ily a kind of thought-experiment, rather than focusing on a historically accu-
rate or representative account of the development of a value, concept, or
practice (though accurate history certainly does have a role to play) and it
seeks to affirm and reinforce our faith in what it investigates, rather than
to challenge it. We argue that this kind of genealogy is particularly useful
for providing positive support for values, concepts and practices in ways
that make sense to us, avoid appeal to potentially tricky ideas of ‘real inter-
ests’, and that respect the fundamentally collective nature of such political
phenomena and their value. Section 4 discusses what we call Quentin Skin-
ner’s genealogy as conceptual mapping and reconstruction. Unlike the
other two, this aims to be an accurate historical investigation that provides
a representative map of the main concepts of the state within a particular
social and historical context. It combines critique and vindication by criticis-
ing some of those concepts and vindicating one of them. We argue that this
kind of genealogy contributes to political philosophy by uncovering
different historical concepts we were unaware of and that may be of use
to us; helps us to understand those concepts by explaining how they
arose and were used in the past; and offers a positive normative argument
for why we should abandon our currently dominant concept of the state for
another one. Finally, we conclude by reflecting on our analysis and how it
contributes to enhancing the toolbox available to political philosophers.
2. Genealogy as critique: Raymond Geuss’ public Goods, Private
Goods
Raymond Geuss’ most extensive genealogy is titled Public Goods, Private
Goods. 2 In it, Geuss aims to challenge what he takes to be our commonly
held adherence to the notion of a single, unitary, and constant public/
private distinction. He writes:
I wish to argue that there is no single clear distinction between public and
private but rather a series of overlapping contrasts, and thus that the distinction
2In the English edition, Geuss does not talk of his work here in terms of genealogy. However, the German
title (Privatheit: Eine Genealogie) has the word ‘genealogy’ in the title, and we should also note that what
Geuss is doing here does roughly fit much of how he describes Nietzsche’s genealogy in contrast to
tracing a pedigree in (Geuss 1999). He also describes genealogy as a method in Geuss 2005, 153-160,
Geuss 2004, 115-122, and Geuss 2008, 68.
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between the public and the private should not be taken to have the significance
often attributed to it. One result of this, I think, should be a change in the way we
think about the good in various public and private contexts. (Geuss 2003, 6)
For Geuss, the public/private distinction is ‘an ideological concretion’
(Geuss 2003, 9). It has come about through a number of disparate com-
ponents ‘from different sources and belonging to different spheres’
coming together ‘historically in an unclear way’, and which have ‘accu-
mulated around themselves a kind of capital of self-evidence, plausibility,
and motivational force’ (Geuss 2003, 9). This distinction is often used
unreflectively, which ‘restricts our possibilities of perceiving and under-
standing our world’ and can help ‘undeserving’ features of the world
and courses of action to seem better than they ought to be (Geuss
2003, 9).
To remedy this, Geuss does not sketch the historical development of
the public/private distinction3, but instead looks at four instances where
something like the private/public distinction appears in Western history.
These instances are supposed to be historically accurate of course, but
they do not, and are not intended to, trace out the historical development
of the public/private distinction (in Europe or elsewhere), provide a repre-
sentative view of the different public/private distinctions within a particu-
lar social and historical context, or lay bare the drives, forces, and
motivations underlying this development. The first instance he discusses
is Diogenes of Sinope’s public masturbation in the Athenian marketplace,
why it was found to be offensive by his peers at the time, and why he
might have been driven to do it. Other instances of the public/private dis-
tinction that Geuss discusses feature Julius Caesar’s decision to defy the
Roman Senate, St. Augustine’s retreat from public life to contemplate his
private spirituality, and the tension between modern liberalism’s emphasis
on the protection of privacy and the availability of a rationally communic-
able public good.
This genealogy shows that there ‘is no such thing as the public/private
distinction’, insofar as there is no ‘single substantive distinction here that
can be made to do any real philosophical or political work’ (Geuss 2003,
106). This does not, however, mean that the public/private distinction
has, or that Geuss takes it to have, no meaning or value, past or present.
Rather, it means that this meaning is shown to be historically varied and
contingent, destroying the oft-held implicit assumption that there is a
3He therefore writes that ‘I need not (and do not) claim either historical or conceptual completeness for my
account’ (Geuss 2003, 10).
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single, unitary, and historically constant distinction of this kind throughout
Western (or broader human) history.
In sum, the genealogy that Geuss offers in Public Goods, Private Goods is
an attempt at accurate history; and it has the aim of challenging or criti-
quing our convictions in a significant way – in this case, our unreflective
usage of, and commitment to, a single, unitary, and historically constant
public/private distinction. It does this by inviting the reader to consider
a brief and explicitly selective account of the history of an important pol-
itical conceptual distinction. This account evokes a crisis in the reader’s
self-understanding by making them realise that their seemingly familiar
and well-understood concept is much more historically varied, incoherent,
and confused than they thought. The disturbance this causes drives the
reader to reflect upon their own hitherto-uncritical usage of the
concept.4 This is supposed, in turn, to lead the reader to increase their
understanding of the political world, in particular the complications of
this particular concept or distinction, to come to use the concept in a
better-informed and more sophisticated way, and to improve some of
their political judgments and actions as a result. As such, this kind of gen-
ealogy does not and need not map a range of different concepts or ideas
relevant to the object under investigation in a systematic or representative
way. Unlike some genealogies, in particular Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Mor-
ality (Nietzsche 2017), there is also no systematic attempt at uncovering
the forces, drives, and motivations behind the development of the
public/private distinction in different contexts.
This kind of genealogy is, however, critical in a particular way. By chan-
ging how we understand important concepts, genealogies of this kind
enable a form of critique that does not itself argue for a particular evalua-
tive judgment of any particular practice, institution, or proposal of the kind
‘X is undesirable/impermissible because of a’, such as ‘corporate collection
of cell-phone data is undesirable/impermissible because it violates our
right to privacy’. Rather, it alters the conceptual frameworks we use to
make such judgments, by making us rethink what e.g. a ‘right to
privacy’ does and should amount to. More broadly, the way that such gen-
ealogies reveal the historical variation and contingency of a concept, in
this case of any public/private distinction, helps to open up the reader’s
imagination to alternatives to and within the present (see Janosch Prinz
2016). By showing us how other people have thought of things differently,
4It might be argued that genealogies of this kind therefore tend to, and perhaps even should, be pre-
sented at least partly in an exaggerated or hyperbolic form (Saar 2007). By contrast, a non-critical gen-
ealogy would take an exclusively and soberly hermeneutical form closer to Bevir’s (2008) approach.
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they show us that we too can think of them differently. This in turn pre-
pares the ground for considering how current social arrangements, includ-
ing power relations, help to shape the formation and current meaning of it
for us and how these social arrangements might distort our understanding
of it.
Genealogy as critique is therefore particularly suitable for supporting
ideology critique. We have just shown how it reveals the contingent and
contradictory nature of current concepts that tend to appear natural or
otherwise self-evident. Genealogy as critique thus plays a problematising
role, offering a stimulus to critically examining the concepts they take for
granted (see also Koopman 2013 and Saar 2007). This problematising role
is important and valuable to political philosophy. However, political philos-
ophy requires not just problematisation; it also needs to make concrete
judgments, or at least offer guidance to agents making concrete judg-
ments for themselves. We will argue that genealogy as critique can do
this through the role it plays in certain kinds of ideology critique.
On the face of it, this claim may seem hard to sustain. For instance,
David Owen (2002, 19) argues that genealogy and ideology critique
address very different problems. Genealogy addresses the problem of
the contingent historical limitation of one’s perspective, whilst ideology
critique usually is taken to address a distortion of consciousness for the
benefit of particular agents.5 If genealogy and ideology critique attempt
to address such different problems, what role can the former play in
and for the latter?
At its best, ideology critique seeks to change both our understanding
of a certain social phenomenon (religion, capitalism, and so on) and the
phenomenon itself. The latter can be taken as a continuation of the
former, insofar as changing how we understand and make sense of a
social phenomenon will be an important part of, and often a necessary
condition for, changing it.6 In classical Marxism, for instance, the critique
of capitalist ideology is supposed to change workers’ understanding of
capitalism, including their own role within it, as part of a process of con-
sciousness-raising which will help them go on to replace capitalism with
socialism (Lukács 1971). In this way, the critique of capitalist ideology is
supposed to provide what Geuss calls ‘enlightening emancipation’ from
5For the sake of argument, we can accept this distinction as stated by Owen (2002). We would quibble a
bit with his definition of ideology critique, but that would require too detailed discussion to deserve a
place here.
6We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point.
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the ideological shackles of capitalism, which in turn supports a process
of ‘real emancipation’ from capitalism itself (Geuss 1981, 73–75, 86).
Our argument is that genealogy as critique can play two valuable roles
for enlightening emancipation. The first role it can play is for political phi-
losophers interested in ideology critique. Here it acts as a kind of fermen-
tation starter (see also Rahel Jaeggi’s account of immanent criticism in
Jaeggi 2009, 2014). By demonstrating the historical variation and
change of important political concepts, genealogy as critique denatura-
lises them for political philosophers. That is, it shows them to be contin-
gent human creations that have arisen within and responded to
different political contexts. To the political philosopher, this shows that
they have two features that make them potential subjects of ideology cri-
tique. First, it shows that they are capable of being altered, eliminated,
and/or replaced by human agents in order to better meet their needs
and interests. Second, this in turn means that they are potential targets
of ideology critique, insofar as ideology critique can help to foster this
sort of change (see also Honneth 2000).
The second role that genealogy as critique can play vis-à-vis ideology
critique is played with respect to the agents addressed by the latter. In
fact, brief genealogies as critique are common parts of many ideology
critiques. Thus, brief genealogies of capitalism are common in a lot of
Marxist ideology critiques precisely because they are supposed to
show that capitalism is a historically contingent human creation that
was preceded by other social formations, that was introduced by
human action to replace such previous formations, and thus is, at least
in principle, open to being replaced by human action in the future.
Indeed, such accounts are present throughout Marx’s own political
economy, in part to drive home this important insight and thus to dena-
turalise capitalism to his readers (Marx 1990, 163–77). The point here is
that the denaturalising effects of genealogy as critique – showing certain
phenomena to be historically varied, contingent, and often confused –
helps to enable the addressees of ideology critiques to be able to
view their ways of understanding these phenomena as open to
change and possibly affected by power relations in unacceptable ways.
This in turn makes it possible for them to consider the subsequent
main arguments of the ideology critique, which typically show that
certain values, concepts, and ways of understanding have been unaccep-
tably distorted by certain power relations.
Genealogy as critique is therefore valuable to political philosophy in at
least two major ways: as a fermentation starter for ideology critics and as
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a valuable part of a work of ideology critique itself. Notwithstanding
Owen’s argumentation, genealogy and ideology critique can go hand
in hand in a mutually supportive and reinforcing way. The right sort of
genealogy can both spark and constitute a valuable part of ideology
critique.
2. Imaginary genealogy: Bernard Williams’ Truth and
Truthfulness
Bernard Williams’ Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy takes a very
different approach. The aim of what Williams calls ‘imaginary genealogy’
(Williams 2002, 32) is to present an ‘imagined developmental story,
which helps to explain a concept or value or institution by showing
ways in which it could have come about in a simplified environment con-
taining certain kinds of interests or capacities, which, relative to the story,
are taken as given’ (Williams 2002, 21). This is accompanied by a broader
definition of what genealogy in general is, to include not only ‘a narrative
which tries to explain a cultural phenomenon by describing a way in which
it came about’, but also ‘how it could have come about, or might be ima-
gined to have come about’ (Williams 2002, 20). He thus includes not only
familiar works termed genealogy, but also works which often are not – and
were never labelled as such by their authors – such as Hume’s account of
the origins of justice (Hume 2000, 1999) and Nozick’s story about how a
minimal state might arise (Nozick 1974).
It follows that this sort of genealogy is fact-defective (Williams 2002, 32)
in a particular way. All genealogies are likely to be fact-defective insofar as
they are likely to get some facts wrong. Imaginary genealogies, by their
very natures, will inevitably be fact-defective in the same ways: they too
will contain a story which gets at least some of the facts wrong.
However, imaginary genealogies are fact-defective in a more interesting
way, insofar as they don’t aim at historical accuracy. This is one thing
that differentiates this type of genealogy from the others discussed
here. The imagined genealogy is not primarily an attempt at developing
an accurate picture of how some phenomenon arose in and through
history, which particular forces and interests drove its development, or
even to map out and reconstruct the basic permutations of important con-
cepts, values, or ideas. Instead, its aim is to develop an imagined story to
explain or make sense of a social phenomenon, in Williams’ case the value
and importance of truth and truthfulness.
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Thus, for Williams the purpose of an imaginary genealogy is to explain a
cultural phenomenon by explaining how it ‘might be imagined to have
come about’ (Williams 2002, 20):
An imaginary genealogy (…) is explanatory because it represents as functional a
concept, reason, motivation, or other aspect of human thought and behaviour,
where that item was perhaps not previously seen as functional; the explanation
of the function is unmysterious, because in particular it does not appeal to inten-
tions or deliberations or (in this respect) already purposive thought; and the
motivations that are invoked in the explanation are ones that are agreed to
exist anyway. (Williams 2002, 34)
This is not to say that real history plays absolutely no part for Williams’
account. As Mathieu Queloz has rightly pointed out, real history comes
in to explain how our actual practices differ from the functional model
we require (Queloz 2018a, 7).
Thus, for Williams the purpose of an imaginary genealogy is to explain a
cultural phenomenon by building an abstract model of how it ‘might be
imagined to have come about’ (Williams 2002, 20) in view of certain inter-
ests and capacities which are taken as given, together with an account of
how their concrete manifestations – e.g. currently existing conceptions of
truthfulness – have been shaped in various ways by more particular, local
needs (Queloz 2018b, 4). Thus, if ‘the genealogist ends up with something
sufficiently like our local form of the practice in question, he or she will
have a reasonable claim to having explained why we might have come
by the practice in terms of its original point’ (Queloz 2018b, 4).
Williams’ imaginary genealogy also has a clear vindicatory purpose. Its
aim is not to undermine, critique, or challenge our outlook on truth and
truthfulness; it is to reinforce and strengthen that outlook through explain-
ing it in a particular way. It achieves this purpose by telling a kind of just-so
story about how a cultural phenomenon (e.g. the disposition toward truth-
fulness) may have been brought into existence in a community seeking to
realise interests that we share. Because we take ourselves to share these
interests and capacities, this story in turn tells us why cultivating these
social phenomena is valuable to our community – the reasons why
these cultural phenomena might have been brought about in a properly
constructed imaginary situation reveal to us the reasons why these
phenomena are valuable for us.
It’s worth briefly comparing this to his views on what Nietzsche does in
his genealogy. Williams argues that Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality has
the aim of providing an explanation of morality that those who identify
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with that sort of morality cannot accept. If it is accepted, Nietzsche’s gen-
ealogy is supposed to render this system of morality reflectively unaccep-
table, driving its adherents to change their outlook (Williams 2002, 37; but
see Queloz and Cueni 2019). By contrast, Williams’ genealogy is supposed
to show ‘why truthfulness has an intrinsic value; why it can be seen as such
with a good conscience; why a good conscience is a good thing with
which to see it’ (Williams 2002, 263).
In summary, unlike Geuss’ (above) or Skinner’s (below), Williams’ imagin-
ary genealogy is not primarily an attempt at an accurate –much less repre-
sentative – historical investigation. This is not to deny that there is some
accurate history in Truth and Truthfulness that plays an important role in
his discussion; it only points out that the genealogy itself is not intended
to provide a generally accurate historical account of the development of
commitments to these phenomena. Williams also does not aim to challenge
or critique the convictions that he seeks to explain; instead, his genealogy is
an explicit attempt to affirm and reinforce those convictions. Williams’ gen-
ealogy does not aim to map out and reconstruct a set of concepts or ideas
that have existed through time, nor does it aim to uncover the historically
contingent drives, forces, or motivations behind the development of what
it investigates.
Imaginary genealogy provides at least two valuable contributions to
political philosophy that we want to draw attention to. Firstly, it shows
how genealogical investigation can be used not only to undermine or
challenge our faith in our existing political values and concept, but also
to provide positive support for them. In contrast to genealogies as critique,
imaginary genealogies can lend positive justification for those values, con-
cepts, and practices that pass its test. It does this by explaining how they
might have come about in response to powers and interests we agree to
take for granted, and thus in response to the positive function they have
for us. This expands our understanding of what genealogy can achieve,
showing us how it can be used to provide positive legitimations for
values, concepts, and practices. It can also, by informing political agents
about e.g. which practices are legitimate and which values they should
adhere to, help to guide their actions in constructive ways.
Furthermore, these justifications respect and give voice to the funda-
mentally collective dimension of politics. Imaginary genealogies are able
to justify political values as properly political values – that is, as values
that are intrinsically about certain kinds of collective practices. A great
deal of real politics is concerned not with the principles that should
guide individual actions, but with broader ethical concerns about what
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kinds of collective practices we should value, cultivate, support, change, or
eliminate. Imaginary genealogies reflect this through their focus on the
‘reasons for the collective to cultivate certain practices, rather than
reasons for the individual to participate in those practices’ (Queloz
2018b, 19). Some genealogies may provide reasons why the individual
ought to participate in those practices, but imaginary genealogies of Wil-
liams’ kind don’t necessarily and Williams’, as Queloz points out, does not.
Rather, what imaginary genealogies do is give reasons for why it makes
sense for collectives to adopt or cultivate the practices in question, and
these reasons need not reduce to the reasons individuals have for partici-
pating in them. While Queloz views this collective perspective as a limit-
ation of the ability of genealogy to change an individual’s space of
reasons (2018b, 19), we instead view it as a strength. The inherently collec-
tive nature of its explanation for our political values, concepts, and prac-
tices enables imaginary genealogy to justify them as properly political
values (Hall 2017; Raekstad 2018; Williams 2005).
Secondly, imaginary vindicatory genealogy provides a novel way to
relate the normative and explanatory dimensions of political philosophy.
Normative and explanatory dimensions are often strictly kept apart in pol-
itical philosophy whose concept of normativity has Neo-Kantian roots
(Beiser 2009). This separation has arguably led much contemporary nor-
mative political philosophy to grow stale and disconnected from, and
therefore increasingly irrelevant to, political realities in a way that a lot
of other even fairly recent political philosophy (e.g. in the works of Frie-
drich Hayek on the right or Herbert Marcuse on the left) was not.
Imaginary genealogy brings the normative into connection with the
explanatory by linking its justifications of values, concepts, and practices
to explanations of how they in fact satisfy our capacities and interests.
One of the advantages of doing this is that it offers a way of bringing
together empirical considerations of whether certain values, concepts,
and practices satisfy or realise interests we take ourselves to have with
the normative question of whether we should judge them to be legiti-
mate. Another of its advantages is that it avoids reference to the notor-
iously difficult notion of ‘objective interests’ (see Geuss 1981, chapter 3)
as a basis for its normative assessments. This offers a constructive –
limited, but powerful – way of bridging the empirical-normative divide
in order to say something concrete about what real political agents
should value and be guided by.
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3. Genealogy as conceptual mapping and reconstruction:
Quentin Skinner’s ‘a genealogy of the modern state’
Finally, for Skinner, tracing the genealogy of a concept is a way of unco-
vering ‘the different ways in which it may have been used in earlier times’,
through which we ‘equip ourselves with a means of reflecting critically on
how it is currently understood’ (Skinner 2008, 325). In ‘A Genealogy of the
Modern State’, he sets out to do just this for the modern concept of the
state. More precisely, he analyses how the word ‘state’ came to figure in
debates about public power in ‘Anglophone traditions of thought’
(Skinner 2008, 325) during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries.
Skinner distinguishes between four different concepts of the ‘state’
during this period. Towards the end of the 16th and beginning of the
seventeenth century, the ‘absolutist’ concept of the state develops,
according to which the state is thought of in terms of a group of people
gathered together as a body, subject to the will of a monarch as the
head (of the body/community) (Skinner 2008, 328–32). The state is here
transformed from an earlier meaning in terms of a state of affairs or con-
dition which the prince or monarch should preserve, to a notion of a body
politic, of which the prince or monarch is the head and which the latter
should keep secure and healthy. This goes along with a particular
notion of legitimacy, according to which actions are legitimate iff they
are performed by the rightful head of state. In the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, this was challenged by the populist concept of the state,
according to which the state is (as on the absolutist conception) a commu-
nity of people under a government, but where sovereignty rests with the
community as a whole, rather than with a prince or monarch (Skinner
2008, 332–40). On this view, actions are legitimate iff they are performed
in the right sort of way by the will of the people.
Both of these are challenged by Hobbes’ development of what Skinner
calls the fictional concept of the state (Skinner 2008, 341–48). Hobbes
rejects the populist idea that sovereign power originally rested in a com-
munity of people, because, he argues, no such united community exists in
the original state of nature. He also rejects the absolutist conception of
individual citizens as passive members of the state, arguing that their
consent is essential for establishing sovereign power and that they
remain the authors of its actions. As is well known, Hobbes argues that
people in the state of nature covenant together to confer sovereign
power on either one person or an assembly. In so doing, the covenant
brings into being two new persons who did not exist in the state of
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nature. First, by covenanting together we transform ourselves from a mul-
titude ‘into a unified group’, establishing an artificial person, the sovereign,
‘to whom we grant authority to speak and act in our name’ (Skinner 2008,
345). Second, ‘when we acquire a single will and voice by way of authoris-
ing a man or assembly to serve as our representative’, we bring a new
fictional person into being, namely the state (Skinner 2008, 345). The
state is ‘fictional’ in the sense that it never acts or accepts responsibility
for its actions except through its representative, the sovereign. Thus,
according to Hobbes the act of covenanting establishes two new compo-
site persons: the fictional person of the state and the artificial person of the
sovereign as its representative. On Hobbes’ view, actions are legitimate iff
they (1) are undertaken by a sovereign properly authorised to speak and
act on behalf of the state and (2) aim to preserve the life and health of
the state, ‘and hence the common good or public interest of its subjects
not merely at the time of acting but in perpetuity’ (Skinner 2008, 348).
Fourth and finally, from the end of the eighteenth century this is chal-
lenged by the reductionist concept of the state, according to which the
‘state’ is simply reduced to any apparatus of government or the persons
in charge of it (Skinner 2008, 355–60).
Skinner argues that this genealogy shows that the word ‘state’ has
never corresponded to any one single, unitary, and constant concept,
revealing its ‘contingent and contestable character’ along with the
‘impossibility of showing that is has any essence or natural boundaries’,
and suggesting that this is probably inevitable for any concept so
‘enmeshed in ideological disputes’ over such a long time (Skinner 2008,
326). Today, he thinks, both populist and absolutist concepts of the
state are of merely historical interest. We are thus often left with a reduc-
tionist view of the state, but would profit from turning to the fictional one
instead (Skinner 2008, 361). Skinner goes on to argue that we should adopt
a fictional concept of the state, because it better brings to the fore and
emphasises the necessity of preserving the safety and health of the
state for assessing the legitimacy of its actions (especially in times of emer-
gency) and ‘to make sense of the claim that some government actions
have the effect of binding not merely the body of the people but their
remote posterity’ (Skinner 2008, 363), as when the state incurs public
debts which it is later – when under the direction of an entirely new set
of people – expected to respect.
In sum, Skinner’s genealogy of the concept of the state is an attempt at
a historically accurate account of how this concept arose, at least in ‘Anglo-
phone traditions of thought’ (Skinner 2008, 325). Like Geuss’, Skinner’s
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genealogy makes no systematic attempt at uncovering the drives, forces,
and motivations behind this concept’s development. However, unlike
Geuss’, Skinner’s genealogy of the state does provide a certain map of rel-
evant concepts and ideas, as well as of their development and it aims at a
certain kind of representativeness in its account, insofar as it attempts to
map out the main concepts of the state within a particular social and his-
torical context. In its emphasis on both critique and vindication – critiquing
the reductionist concept of the state and advocating the fictional one –
Skinner’s genealogy falls somewhere between Geuss’ genealogy as cri-
tique and Williams’ imaginary (vindicatory) genealogy.
What is the value of Skinner’s brand of genealogy for political philos-
ophy? Like Geuss’, Skinner’s genealogy of the state disaggregates its
concept, showing that there is no one single concept of the state, but
instead a number of distinct ones, each with its own advantages and draw-
backs. Unlike Williams’ kind of genealogy, Skinner’s approach doesn’t
rescue a single thing – such as a single concept of the state – as the
one that has been around for a long time, that is still at work in our
thoughts and practices in some way, and show us why it is valuable and
worth holding on to. This is part of Skinner’s broader historical project
of preventing that we ‘fall under the spell of our own intellectual heritage’,
deploying history to ‘help to liberate us from the grip of any one hegemo-
nial account of those values and how they should be interpreted and
understood’ (Skinner 2002, 6). By showing us ‘the essential variety of
moral assumptions and political commitments’ (Skinner 2002, 88), this
‘frees us to re-evaluate what we once believed’ (Frazer 2019, 92).
However, Skinner’s genealogy as conceptual mapping and reconstruc-
tion is much more constructive than Geuss’ genealogy as critique is. This is
because Skinner’s genealogy offers a clear and explicit positive proposal:
after examining a number of different concepts of the state, he argues
that one of these concepts – the fictional one – is superior not only to
its historical competitors, but also to our currently dominant concept of
the state for good normative reasons. As we have seen, Skinner argues
that we should embrace the fictional conception of the state over our
current one because (i) it better emphasises the necessity of preserving
the safety and health of the state for assessing the legitimacy of its
actions – especially, but not only, during times of emergency – and (ii) it
is more useful for ‘mak[ing] sense of the claim that some government
actions have the effect of binding not merely the body of the people
but their remote posterity’, such as signing international treaties or
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taking on debts (Skinner 2008, 363). This in effect revalues the state
through driving us, the genealogy’s audience, to reconceptualise it.
Skinner’s brand of genealogy is an instance of constructive conceptual
reform or development, which in turn has valuable implications for making
normative judgments about the legitimacy of state action. If Skinner is
right, one of the advantages of the fictional concept of the state is that
adopting it improves our ability to make normative judgments about
the legitimacy of state actions and to judge the normative nature and
implications of some of the state’s most important actions, namely
when it performs actions that bind the body of the people into posterity.
Although Skinner’s genealogy itself doesn’t go on to make these judg-
ments, it provides political philosophers with valuable tools – and persua-
sive arguments for the value and usefulness of specifically those tools –
which they can employ when developing normative principles for asses-
sing the legitimacy of state action and judging state action in accordance
with these principles. This genealogy thereby contributes to contemporary
theories of legitimacy.
This view is not uncontroversial. For instance, Michael Frazer (Frazer
2019) has recently argued that Skinner’s historicist approach to history –
which is certainly evident in his genealogy of the state – has some
serious ethical shortcomings – many of which are concerned with his par-
ticular approach to history, which we won’t examine in detail here. The
important part of Frazer’s argument for our purposes is the argument
that when such intellectual history ‘intersects with our current concerns’,
it does so only ‘in a negative way’, by ‘criticizing everything and defending
nothing except autonomy itself’ (Frazer 2019, 93). The problem with this is
that ‘[a]fter the criticism of tradition is complete, the past can no longer
offer the practical wisdom that we once depended on to guide our exist-
ence’ (Frazer 2019, 93). If this is true of Skinner’s genealogy, it would seem
to follow that the latter can offer nothing of positive value to political
philosophy.
We would argue that Skinner’s genealogy does not fall foul of these cri-
tiques. As we have seen, Skinner’s genealogy offers two normative argu-
ments for the positive value or usefulness of one concept of the state
for normative political philosophy. One might respond that one cannot
derive an ought from an is – one cannot derive a normative argument
for the fictional concept of the state from a descriptive genealogy of
how the concept of the state has developed. This general claim is of
course true, but Skinner’s argument rests on no such fallacy. Rather, Skin-
ner’s genealogy provides a descriptive account of different historical
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concepts of the state and combines this with normative arguments for
why we should adopt one of them over the one that’s dominant today.
But what, if anything, is then the value of Skinner’s genealogy, as distinct
from this normative argumentation?
The value of Skinner’s brand of genealogy to political philosophy is
threefold. First, it uncovers different historical concepts that are of use
to us – even more so than the ones we presently employ. Second, it
tells us how these concepts arose and how they can be used for certain
valuable ends. The latter it does in a rather trivial way: by detailing how
these concepts were used to valuable ends in the past, it shows us that,
in relevantly similar conditions and ceteris paribus, they can be used to
such valuable ends today. Third, based on this conceptual mapping and
reconstruction we can give normative arguments for why some of these
are more valuable to us than those we employ, or employ more com-
monly, today. In this way, Skinner’s genealogy provides a positive and con-
structive contribution to normative political philosophy.
4. Conclusion: a genealogy of genealogies
The foregoing analysis gives us a picture of three projects that are called
‘genealogy’ today, by three thinkers who are very close geographically,
socially, and historically and who have known and influenced each
other in important ways. In spite of this proximity, we have seen that
they are strikingly different. While Geuss’ genealogy as critique and Skin-
ner’s genealogy as conceptual mapping and reconstruction focus on
offering accurate historical accounts, Williams’ imaginary genealogy
instead focuses on a particular kind of thought-experiment. While Skin-
ner’s maps relevant meanings of a concept with some claim to being
representative of the different variants available among a particular
group of people at a particular time, neither Geuss’ nor Williams’ do.
While Geuss’ aims to challenge and critique the object of investigation,
Williams’ instead seeks to vindicate it and reconcile us to it, and Skinner’s
does a bit of both. This does not mean, and should not be taken to mean,
that the concept of genealogy is necessarily empty or devoid of meaning,
nor that the concept of genealogy is too confused to warrant continued
use. We think that there is still good reason to talk about genealogy in
several of its forms, but when we do so we should be clear about precisely
which of the different kinds of genealogy we are discussing and what
exactly we are trying to achieve by using it.
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One reason for this is that, as we’ve shown, different genealogies have
very different uses as tools of political philosophy. Geuss’ genealogy as cri-
tique plays a problematising role, stimulating those who read it to think
differently about political concepts and to act differently as a result. It is
particularly useful for enabling ideology critique, where it can play the
role of ‘fermentation starter’ by denaturalising familiar political concepts
and thus revealing them as potential objects of ideology critique. Geneal-
ogy as critique also serves as a useful part of the process of ideology cri-
tique itself, where it can show that concepts, values, and practices are
contingent, subject to historical change and variation, and, potentially dis-
torted by certain power relations in ways identified by the ideology critique
proper. Williams’ imaginary genealogy enables us to give compelling argu-
ments that combine certain kinds of empirical and normative investigation
to justify or vindicate values, concepts, and practices to political agents,
reconciling the latter with the former, and thereby provides a very
different kind of concrete guidance for their actions. Finally, Skinner’s gen-
ealogy as conceptual mapping and reconstruction provides us not only with
a more comprehensive understanding of conceptual variation and change
than the other two, but also a combination of argumentation for one
concept and critique of its competitors. These different uses of genealogy
for political philosophy are unsurprising: given how very different these gen-
ealogies are, it would be shocking indeed if they did, or were supposed to
do, the same thing for us. A more complete understanding of the differ-
ences between these different genealogical methods or approaches, and
the different purposes they serve, enables us to be much more precise
about exactly what we are doing when we are practicing different kinds
of genealogy.
In a sense, our argument here is itself a form of genealogy, one essen-
tially similar to Geuss’ in Public Goods, Private Goods. It aims to represent
the genealogies of Geuss, Skinner, and Williams in a faithful and accurate
way; it doesn’t per se aim at representativeness, nor does it involve a
hypothetical thought-experiment or aim to affirm or reinforce its object;
it aims to challenge or critique its object in a limited way, insofar as it
argues that our usage of the term ‘genealogy’ today does not pick out
any one single, coherent, and unified concept which corresponds to it,
but a number of importantly different concepts and approaches, which
have different uses for political philosophy. However, we do not intend
this to furnish any kind of challenge to or critique of genealogy – either
in general or particular kinds thereof. Rather, what we have offered
should instead help us to be better able to understand and employ
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different forms of genealogy in a self-reflexive way – employing the
precise kind of genealogy we want for the task to which it is best suited
– in turn helping us better make sense of the world around us and
perhaps also change it for the better.
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